Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand
Marketing Science
Indirect Network Externality Effects on Product Attributes
Marketing Science
R&D, Marketing, and the Success of Next-Generation Products
Marketing Science
Informational cascades in IT adoption
Communications of the ACM - Human-computer etiquette
Product Strategy for Innovators in Markets with Network Effects
Marketing Science
Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
Management Science
Editorial: Save ResearchAbandon the Case Method of Teaching
Marketing Science
The Benefits of Downstream Information Acquisition
Marketing Science
Managerial Entrenchment with Strategic Information Technology: A Dynamic Perspective
Journal of Management Information Systems
What drives global ICT adoption? Analysis and research directions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Many emerging technologies exhibit path-dependent demands driven by positive network feedback. Such network effects profoundly impact marketing strategists' thinking in today's network economy. However, the significant network externalities expected by many people often fail to materialize in the emerging technology market. We analyze this phenomenon in the context of a technology distribution channel. By studying cheap-talk strategies under information asymmetry, we show that incentive-compatible contracts are essential for achieving credible information transmission. In our model, the better-informed technology vendor has an incentive to inflate the retailer's ex ante belief of network externalities when a wholesale price contract is adopted. When properly termed revenue-sharing contracts are implemented, there are information-efficient cheap-talk equilibria where truthful information transmission is mutually beneficial. When the vendor's information is imperfect, even revenue-sharing contracts cannot guarantee credible information transmission if there is significant prior belief disparity between the vendor and the retailer. This study demonstrates how information-inefficient equilibria (e.g., information blockage) arise because of the conflict of interest or the conflict of opinion among channel members. It also explores the role of cheap talk in facilitating channel coordination.