The Marketing Information Revolution
The Marketing Information Revolution
Marketing Engineering: Computer-Assisted Marketing Analysis and Planning
Marketing Engineering: Computer-Assisted Marketing Analysis and Planning
Commercial Use of Upc Scanner Data: Industry and Academic Perspectives
Marketing Science
Markets for Product Modification Information
Marketing Science
Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition
Management Science
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
Management Science
Research NoteThe Benefits of Personalized Pricing in a Channel
Marketing Science
Asymmetric Wholesale Pricing: Theory and Evidence
Marketing Science
Fairness and Channel Coordination
Management Science
Information and Inventory in Distribution Channels
Management Science
Information Acquisition and Sharing in a Vertical Relationship
Marketing Science
When More Alternatives Lead to Less Choice
Marketing Science
Why Are Bad Products So Hard to Kill?
Management Science
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This study investigates the effects of turning terabytes of raw retail data into managerial insights (i.e., downstream information acquisition) in a strategic channel setting. Two effects of information acquisition are identified---the efficiency effect that improves retail pricing decision making in an uncertain environment, and the strategic effect whereby the retailer voluntarily discloses the acquired private information to influence the upstream manufacturer's wholesale pricing behavior. It is shown that the efficiency effect benefits the retailer without affecting the manufacturer, while the strategic effect works to the detriment of the retailer but to the advantage of the manufacturer. Nevertheless, unobservable information acquisition can mitigate the retailer's loss and the manufacturer's benefit from the strategic effect of information disclosure. Moreover, an increasing expected information acquisition cost may benefit the retailer, when that cost is low and information acquisition is unobservable to the manufacturer. The implications of this paper can shed light on how firms interact in a channel where the downstream market is data intensive, but information gleaning is costly.