Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
Reducing buyer search costs: implications for electronic marketplaces
Management Science - Special issue: Frontier research on information systems and economics
Value of Information in Capacitated Supply Chains
Management Science
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition
Marketing Science
Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand
Marketing Science
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
Management Science
Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues
Management Science
Manufacturer Benefits from Information Integration with Retail Customers
Management Science
Information technology, incentives, and the optimal number of suppliers
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Strategic and competitive information systems
Advertising in a Distribution Channel
Marketing Science
Electronic B2B Marketplaces with Different Ownership Structures
Management Science
Information and Inventory in Distribution Channels
Management Science
Research Note---Vertical Information Sharing in a Volatile Market
Marketing Science
The Benefits of Downstream Information Acquisition
Marketing Science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading environment. We study these effects in business-to-business electronic markets with firms competing in both upstream and downstream industries. The prior literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm (buyer) or the upstream firm (seller) is a monopoly. It is not clear whether information transparency would still create value if both buyers and sellers face oligopolistic competition, where the benefits of information transparency could be competed away. To answer this question, we first develop a simple two-echelon e-market model and then extend the model to more general settings. We find that information transparency can create value for the overall e-market, yet it affects buyers and sellers very differently: one side will be hurt, depending on the competition mode (Cournot or Bertrand) in the downstream. This suggests that a manufacturer-owned, a supplier-owned, and a neutral e-market will have different preferences for information transparency. Finally, we find that information transparency can hurt consumers when the downstream industry engages in Bertrand competition. This is a surprising result given the expectation that online markets create substantial value for consumers.