The role of e-marketplaces in relationship-based supply chains: a survey
IBM Systems Journal
Journal of Computer Security
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
Buyer's Efficient E-Sourcing Structure: Centralize or Decentralize?
Journal of Management Information Systems
Electronic marketplace definition and classification: literature review and clarifications
Enterprise Information Systems
Information Systems Frontiers
How Does Information Technology Shape Supply-Chain Structure? Evidence on the Number of Suppliers
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Systems Research
The Complementary Effects of E-Markets on Existing Supplier-Buyer Relationships in a Supply Chain
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Systems Research
Information Systems Research
Internet Technologies, ECRM Capabilities, and Performance Benefits for SMEs: An Exploratory Study
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Journal of Management Information Systems
Relative Industry Concentration and Customer-Driven IT Spillovers
Information Systems Research
International Journal of Networking and Virtual Organisations
International Journal of Networking and Virtual Organisations
Market Transparency in Business-to-Business e-Commerce: A Simulation Analysis
International Journal of E-Business Research
Journal of Global Information Management
Journal of Management Information Systems
Interorganizational information systems visibility and supply chain performance
International Journal of Information Management: The Journal for Information Professionals
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The abundance of transaction data available on the Internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces. In such a transparent environment, it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals' costs. Is this good news or bad news? In this study, we focus on theinformational effects of business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, and explore firms' incentives to join a B2B exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission. We then study the equilibria by developing a game-theoretic model under asymmetric information. We examine whether the incentives to join a B2B exchange would be different under different competition modes (quantity and price), different information structures, and by varying the nature of the products (substitutes and complements). Our results challenge the "information transparency hypothesis" (i.e., open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms). In contrast to the popular belief, we show that information transparency could be a double-edged sword. The individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality. This may have important implications for the microstructure design (e.g., data access rules) of B2B electronic marketplaces.