Advertising fee in business-format franchising
Management Science
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition
Marketing Science
Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand
Marketing Science
Negotiations and Exclusivity Contracts for Advertising
Marketing Science
Marketing Science
Marketing and Designing Transaction Games
Marketing Science
Benefits of Channel Discord in the Sale of Durable Goods
Marketing Science
Efficiency analysis for display ads and contextual search
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Selling or Advertising: Strategies for Providing Digital Media Online
Journal of Management Information Systems
Pricing display ads and contextual ads: Competition, acquisition, and investment
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Comparative Advertising and In-Store Displays
Marketing Science
Is Persuasive Advertising Always Combative in a Distribution Channel?
Marketing Science
In-Store Media and Distribution Channel Coordination
Marketing Science
The Strategic Perils of Low Cost Outsourcing
Management Science
Competitive Effects of Purchase-Based Targeted Advertising
Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations
Advertising and Consumers' Communications
Marketing Science
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Conventional wisdom suggests that one of the goals of manufacturer advertising is to reduce the cross-price elasticity between products (make one's own and rivals' products appear to be less substitutable in the eyes of consumers). Conventional wisdom also suggests that, all else being equal, retailers will be able to obtain better terms of trade from manufacturers the more substitutable are the manufacturers' products. It follows that retailers should be opposed to advertising that has the effect of reducing cross-price elasticities and thus that manufacturer advertising can be a source of channel conflict. We show that these conventional wisdoms need not hold when only some consumers are exposed to the advertising messages. Using a Hotelling model of demand, we show that (1) manufacturers can be worse off from advertising that reduces the cross-price elasticities between their products, (2) channel conflict need not arise, even when the sole purpose of advertising is to affect cross-price elasticities, and (3) depending on its bargaining power, a retailer can be better off when the manufacturers' products are perceived to be less substitutable.