Tuple-level vs. element-level classification
Results of the Sixth Working Conference of IFIP Working Group 11.3 on Database Security on Database security, VI : status and prospects: status and prospects
Formal semantics of confidentiality in multilevel logic databases
NSPW '94 Proceedings of the 1994 workshop on New security paradigms
Answering queries without revealing secrets
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Formal Models for Computer Security
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Declarative Foundations of Secure Deductive Databases
ICDT '92 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Database Theory
Proving multilevel security of a system design
SOSP '77 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Inference Channel-Free Integrity Constraints in Multilevel Relational Databases
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Collecting Garbage in Multilevel Secure Object Stores
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Supporting security requirements in multilevel real-time databases
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Managing classified documents in a relational database
Das'01 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual working conference on Database and application security
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Many works on secure databases state the simple-security-property as a postulate the necessity of which for achieving confidentiality seems to be out of question. We show that this property is not a postulate but a conclusion the validity of which relies an the assumptions made about the underlying secure environment. We then demonstrate that it contradicts the assumptions made by relational and logic-based databases. This result indicates that the semantic problems secure databases struggle which can be partially attributed to the accession of the simple-security-property.