Secure transaction processing in firm real-time database systems
SIGMOD '97 Proceedings of the 1997 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Issues in security for real-time databases
ACM-SE 36 Proceedings of the 36th annual Southeast regional conference
A secure dynamic copy protocol in real-time secure database systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1999 workshop on Languages, compilers, and tools for embedded systems
Secure Concurrency Control in Firm Real-Time Database Systems
Distributed and Parallel Databases - Security of data and transaction processing
Improving timeliness in real-time secure database systems
ACM SIGMOD Record
Maintaining security and timeliness in real-time database system
Journal of Systems and Software
Shell's Trust Domain Infrastructure Security Certification
Proceedings of the IFIP TC11 WG11.4 First Annual Working Conference on Network Security: Advances in Network and Distributed Systems Security
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
The semantics of an extended referential integrity for a multilevel secure relational data model
Data & Knowledge Engineering
An analysis of the timed Z-channel
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
Subset selection approach for watermarking relational databases
ICDEM'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Data Engineering and Management
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Abstract: Database systems for real-time applications must satisfy timing constraints associated with transactions, in addition to maintaining data consistency. In addition to real-time requirements, security is usually required in many applications. Multilevel security requirements introduce a new dimension to transaction processing in real-time database systems. We argue that due to the conflicting goals of each requirement, trade-offs need to be made between security and timeliness. We first define capacity, a measure of the degree to which security is being satisfied by a system. A secure two-phase locking protocol is then described and a scheme is proposed to allow partial violations of security for improved timeliness. The capacity of the resultant covert channel is derived and a feedback control scheme is proposed that does not allow the capacity to exceed a specified upper bound.