Using one-way functions for authentication
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
A nonce-based protocol for multiple authentications
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
An efficient and secure authentication protocol using uncertified keys
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Refinement and extension of encrypted key exchange
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A Framework for Design of Key Establishment Protocols
ACISP '96 Proceedings of the First Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Designing Secure Key Exchange Protocols
ESORICS '94 Proceedings of the Third European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Proceedings of the International Conference on Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Efficient network authentication protocols: lower bounds and optimal implementations
Distributed Computing
Comparing lower bounds on messages and rounds for two classes of key establishment protocols
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
A DRM security architecture for home networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Design and implementation of a secure wide-area object middleware
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Key establishment protocols using environmental and physiological data in wireless sensor networks
International Journal of Sensor Networks
An extension to bellare and rogaway (1993) model: resetting compromised long-term keys
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Design of key establishment protocol using one-way functions to avert insider-replay attack
ICISS'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Systems Security
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Cryptographic protocols for key establishment normally include some means to allow participants to ensure that a key is new and not replayed from an old protocol run. When the key is generated by a mutually trusted server this is usually achieved by sending with the key a quantity known to be new. A different general method for achieving freshness in this context is proposed. A number of specific example protocols are given which have some practical advantages over previous published protocols.