An extension to bellare and rogaway (1993) model: resetting compromised long-term keys

  • Authors:
  • Colin Boyd;Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo;Anish Mathuria

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia;Dhirubhai Ambani Institute of Information and Communication Technology, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India

  • Venue:
  • ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

A security proof in the Bellare–Rogaway model and the random oracle model is provided for a protocol closely based on one originally proposed by Boyd (1996), which enjoys some remarkable efficiency properties. The model is extended so that it can detect a known weakness of the protocol that cannot be captured in the original model. An alternative protocol is proposed, provably secure in the extended model and the random oracle model, and offering the same efficiency features as the original protocol. Moreover, our alternative protocol provides key confirmation and forward secrecy. It also allows session keys to be renewed in subsequent sessions without the server's further involvement even in the event that the long-term key or the earlier session key have been compromised.