Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proving Security Protocols with Model Checkers by Data Independence Techniques
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security Goals: Packet Trajectories and Strand Spaces
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
New paradigm of inference control with trusted computing
Proceedings of the 21st annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security
IWDW'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Digital-Forensics and Watermarking
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Recent techniques for analyzing security protocols have tended to concentrate upon the small protocols that are typically found in the academic literature. However, there is a huge gulf between these and most large commercial protocols: the latter typically have many more fields, and much higher levels of nested encryption. As a result, existing techniques are difficult to apply directly to these large protocols. In this paper we develop the notion of safe simplifying transformations: transformations that have the property of preserving insecurities; the effect of such transformations is that if we can verify the transformed protocol, then we will have verified the original protocol. We identify a number of such safe simplifying transformations, and use them in the analysis of a commercial protocol.