The Design of a COTSReal-Time Distributed Security Kernel
EDCC-4 Proceedings of the 4th European Dependable Computing Conference on Dependable Computing
Low complexity Byzantine-resilient consensus
Distributed Computing
Fully Distributed Three-Tier Active Software Replication
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Worm-IT - A wormhole-based intrusion-tolerant group communication system
Journal of Systems and Software
Intrusion-tolerant architectures: concepts and design
Architecting dependable systems
Dependability metrics
Uncertainty and predictability: can they be reconciled?
Future directions in distributed computing
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The paper presents a new reliable multicast protocol that tolerates arbitrary faults, including Byzantine faults. This protocol is developed using a novel way of designing secureprotocols which is based on a well-founded hybrid failure model. Despite our claim of arbitrary failure resilience, the protocol needs not necessarily incur the cost of "Byzantine agreement", in number of participants and round/message complexity. It can rely on the existence of a simple distributed security kernel 驴 the TTCB 驴 where the participants only execute crucial parts of the protocol operation, under the protection of a crash failure model. Otherwise, participants follow an arbitrary failure model.The TTCB provides only a few basic services, which allow our protocol to have an efficiency similar to that of accidental fault-tolerant protocols: for f faults, our protocol requires f+2 processes, instead of 3f+1 in Byzantine systems. Besides, the TTCB (which is synchronous) allows secure operation of timed protocols, despite the unpredictable time behavior of the environment (possibly due to attacks on timing assumptions).