Reliable communication in the presence of failures
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Exploiting virtual synchrony in distributed systems
SOSP '87 Proceedings of the eleventh ACM Symposium on Operating systems principles
Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Secure agreement protocols: reliable and atomic group multicast in rampart
CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed systems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A Secure Group Membership Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Building secure and reliable network applications
Building secure and reliable network applications
Byzantine-resistant total ordering algorithms
Information and Computation
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Group communication specifications: a comprehensive study
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
The SecureRing group communication system
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
COCA: A secure distributed online certification authority
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive recovery
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
The Timely Computing Base Model and Architecture
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Encapsulating Failure Detection: From Crash to Byzantine Failures
Ada-Europe '02 Proceedings of the 7th Ada-Europe International Conference on Reliable Software Technologies
Secure Intrusion-tolerant Replication on the Internet
DSN '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Quantifying the Cost of Providing Intrusion Tolerance in Group Communication Systems
DSN '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Diversity against Accidental and Deliberate Faults
CSDA '98 Proceedings of the Conference on Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions
Unreliable Intrusion Detection in Distributed Computations
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Strong and weak virtual synchrony in Horus
SRDS '96 Proceedings of the 15th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
Efficient Byzantine-Resilient Reliable Multicast on a Hybrid Failure Model
SRDS '02 Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
BASE: Using abstraction to improve fault tolerance
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Consensus in byzantine asynchronous systems
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
CoBFIT: A Component-Based Framework for Intrusion Tolerance
EUROMICRO '04 Proceedings of the 30th EUROMICRO Conference
Distributed Computing
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Secure Spread: An Integrated Architecture for Secure Group Communication
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Low complexity Byzantine-resilient consensus
Distributed Computing
The N-Version Approach to Fault-Tolerant Software
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Functional decomposition and interactions in hybrid intrusion-tolerant systems
Proceedings of the 3rd International DiscCoTec Workshop on Middleware-Application Interaction
Journal of Systems and Software
Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper presents Worm-IT, a new intrusion-tolerant group communication system with a membership service and a view-synchronous atomic multicast primitive. The system is intrusion-tolerant in the sense that it behaves correctly even if some nodes are corrupted and become malicious. It is based on a novel approach that enhances the environment with a special secure distributed component used by the protocols to execute securely a few crucial operations. Using this approach, we manage to bring together two important features: Worm-IT tolerates the maximum number of malicious members possible; it does not have to detect the failure of primary-members, a problem in previous intrusion-tolerant group communication systems.