Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed systems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The weakest failure detector for solving consensus
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Failure detectors in omission failure environments
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Muteness detectors for consensus with Byzantine processes
PODC '98 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
From Crash Fault-Tolerance to Arbitrary-Fault Tolerance: Towards a Modular Approach
DSN '00 Proceedings of the 2000 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (formerly FTCS-30 and DCCA-8)
Unreliable Intrusion Detection in Distributed Computations
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A simple and fast asynchronous consensus protocol based on a weak failure detector
Distributed Computing
Worm-IT - A wormhole-based intrusion-tolerant group communication system
Journal of Systems and Software
Research note: On Byzantine generals with alternative plans
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Journal of Systems and Software
Asynchronous Byzantine consensus with 2f+1 processes
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
OPODIS'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
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This paper presents a consensus protocol resilient to Byzantine failures. It uses signed and certified messages and is based on two underlying failure detection modules. The first is a muteness failure detection module of the class ♦M. The second is a reliable Byzantine behaviour detection module. More precisely, the first module detects processes that stop sending messages, while processes experiencing other non-correct behaviours (i.e., Byzantine) are detected by the second module. The protocol is resilient to F faulty processes, F ≤ min(⌊(n - 1)/2⌋, C) (where C is the maximum number of faulty processes that can be tolerated by the underlying certification service).The approach used to design the protocol is new. While usual Byzantine consensus protocols are based on failure detectors to detect processes that stop communicating, none of them use a module to detect their Byzantine behaviour (this detection is not isolated from the protocol and makes it difficult to understand and prove correct). In addition to this modular approach and to a consensus protocol for Byzantine systems, the paper presents a finite state automaton-based implementation of the Byzantine behaviour detection module. Finally, the modular approach followed in this paper can be used to solve other problems in asynchronous systems experiencing Byzantine failures.