Adaptive Cyberdefense for Survival and Intrusion Tolerance
IEEE Internet Computing
A holistic approach to service survivability
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Survivable and self-regenerative systems: in association with 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
TRIAD: a framework for survivability architecting
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Survivable and self-regenerative systems: in association with 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Defending against hitlist worms using network address space randomization
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
Defending against hitlist worms using network address space randomization
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Implementation of authentication techniques across closed ports
EHAC'06 Proceedings of the 5th WSEAS International Conference on Electronics, Hardware, Wireless and Optical Communications
Port and address hopping for active cyber-defense
PAISI'07 Proceedings of the 2007 Pacific Asia conference on Intelligence and security informatics
Multi-agent framework for simulation of adaptive cooperative defense against internet attacks
AIS-ADM'07 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Autonomous intelligent systems: agents and data mining
Honeynet games: a game theoretic approach to defending network monitors
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
TAO: protecting against hitlist worms using transparent address obfuscation
CMS'06 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Openflow random host mutation: transparent moving target defense using software defined networking
Proceedings of the first workshop on Hot topics in software defined networks
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Attacks against distributed systems frequently start at the network layer by gathering network related information (such as open TCP ports) and continue on by exhausting resources, or abusing protocols. Defending against network-based attacks is a major focus area in the APOD (Application That Participate in Their Own Defense) project, which set out to develop technologies that increase an application's resilience against cyber attacks. This paper gives an overview of APOD's current set of network-level defenses. Specific network-based defense mechanisms are described first, followed by a discussion on how to use them in localdefensive behavior. Defense strategies, which specify coordinated defensive behavior across a distributed system, are discussed next, followed by results from initial experimental evaluation.