Computer viruses: theory and experiments
Computers and Security
Sharing and protection in a single-address-space operating system
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) - Special issue on computer architecture
An end-to-end approach to host mobility
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
DNS performance and the effectiveness of caching
IMW '01 Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet Measurement
Code red worm propagation modeling and analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Code-Red: a case study on the spread and victims of an internet worm
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Adaptive Use of Network-Centric Mechanisms in Cyber-Defense
ISORC '03 Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Symposium on Object-Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing
A Network Worm Vaccine Architecture
WETICE '03 Proceedings of the Twelfth International Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
IEEE Security and Privacy
Monitoring and early warning for internet worms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Accurate, scalable in-network identification of p2p traffic using application signatures
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide Web
Shield: vulnerability-driven network filters for preventing known vulnerability exploits
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
MobiDesk: mobile virtual desktop computing
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Transport layer identification of P2P traffic
Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An analysis of TCP reset behaviour on the internet
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
REX: secure, extensible remote execution
ATEC '04 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
OSDI'04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Very fast containment of scanning worms
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Accurate buffer overflow detection via abstract payload execution
RAID'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Exploiting the IPID field to infer network path and end-system characteristics
PAM'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement
Openflow random host mutation: transparent moving target defense using software defined networking
Proceedings of the first workshop on Hot topics in software defined networks
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Worms are self-replicating malicious programs that represent a major security threat for the Internet, as they can infect and damage a large number of vulnerable hosts at timescales where human responses are unlikely to be effective. Sophisticated worms that use precomputed hitlists of vulnerable targets are especially hard to contain, since they are harder to detect, and spread at rates where even automated defenses may not be able to react in a timely fashion. This paper examines a new proactive defense mechanism called Network Address Space Randomization (NASR) whose objective is to harden networks specifically against hitlist worms. The idea behind NASR is that hitlist information could be rendered stale if nodes are forced to frequently change their IP addresses. NASR limits or slows down hitlist worms and forces them to exhibit features that make them easier to contain at the perimeter. We explore the design space for NASR and present a prototype implementation as well as experiments examining the effectiveness and limitations of the approach.