Formally Testing Fail-Safety of Electronic Purse Protocols

  • Authors:
  • Jan Jürjens;Guido Wimmel

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 16th IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Designing and implementing security-critical systemscorrectly is difficult. In practice, most vulnerabilities arisefrom bugs in implementations. We present work towardssystematic specification-based testing of security-criticalsystems using the CASE tool AutoFocus.Cryptographic systems are formally specified with statetransition diagrams, a notation for state machines in theAutoFocus system. We show how to systematically generatetest sequences for security properties based on the modelthat can be used to test the implementation for vulnerabilities.In particular, we focus on the principle of fail-safety.We explain our method at the example of a part of the CommonElectronic Purse Specifications (CEPS).Most commonly, attacks address vulnerabilities in theway security mechanisms are used, rather than the mechanismsthemselves. Being able to treat security aspects witha general CASE tool within the context of system developmentenables detection of such vulnerabilities.