BISS: building secure routing out of an incomplete set of security associations

  • Authors:
  • Srdjan Čapkun;Jean-Pierre Hubaux

  • Affiliations:
  • Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland;Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland

  • Venue:
  • WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We investigate secure routing in ad hoc networks in which security associations exist only between a subset of all pairs of nodes. We focus on source routing protocols. We show that to establish secure routes, it is in general not necessary that security associations exist between all pairs of nodes; a fraction of security associations is sufficient. We analyze the performance of existing proposals for secure routing in such conditions. We also propose a new protocol, designed specifically for ad hoc networks with an incomplete set of security associations between the nodes. We call this protocol BISS: a protocol for Building Secure Routing out of an Incomplete Set of Security Associations. We present a detailed analysis of this protocol, based on simulations, and show that it can be as secure as the existing proposals that rely on a complete set of security associations.