Model-carrying code: a practical approach for safe execution of untrusted applications

  • Authors:

  • R. Sekar;V.N. Venkatakrishnan;Samik Basu;Sandeep Bhatkar;Daniel C. DuVarney

  • Affiliations:

  • Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY

  • Venue:
  • SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

This paper presents a new approach called model-carrying code (MCC) for safe execution of untrusted code. At the heart of MCC is the idea that untrusted code comes equipped with a concise high-level model of its security-relevant behavior. This model helps bridge the gap between high-level security policies and low-level binary code, thereby enabling analyses which would otherwise be impractical. For instance, users can use a fully automated verification procedure to determine if the code satisfies their security policies. Alternatively, an automated procedure can sift through a catalog of acceptable policies to identify one that is compatible with the model. Once a suitable policy is selected, MCC guarantees that the policy will not be violated by the code. Unlike previous approaches, the MCC framework enables code producers and consumers to collaborate in order to achieve safety. Moreover, it provides support for policy selection as well as enforcement. Finally, MCC makes no assumptions regarding the inherent risks associated with untrusted code. It simply provides the tools that enable a consumer to make informed decisions about the risk that he/she is willing to tolerate so as to benefit from the functionality offered by an untrusted application.