Communications of the ACM
Mimicry attacks on host-based intrusion detection systems
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure Execution via Program Shepherding
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Anomaly Detection Using Call Stack Information
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Sense of Self for Unix Processes
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Fast Automaton-Based Method for Detecting Anomalous Program Behaviors
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Model-carrying code: a practical approach for safe execution of untrusted applications
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Efficient Intrusion Detection using Automaton Inlining
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Install-Time Vaccination of Windows Executables to Defend against Stack Smashing Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
System Call Monitoring Using Authenticated System Calls
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Packet vaccine: black-box exploit detection and signature generation
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
StackGhost: Hardware facilitated stack protection
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Non-control-data attacks are realistic threats
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Protecting against unexpected system calls
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Efficient techniques for comprehensive protection from memory error exploits
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Securing software by enforcing data-flow integrity
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
Automated detection of persistent kernel control-flow attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Environment-sensitive intrusion detection
RAID'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
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Computer malwares (e.g., botnets, rootkits, spware) are one of the most serious threats to all computers and networks. Most malwares conduct their malicious actions via hijacking the control flow of the infected system or program. Therefore, it is critically important to protect our mission critical systems from malicious control flows. Inspired by the self-nonself discrimination in natural immune system, this research explores a new direction in building the artificial malware immune systems. Most existing models of self of the protected program or system are passive reflection of the existing being (e.g., system call sequence) of the protected program or system. Instead of passively reflecting the existing being of the protected program, we actively assign a unique mark to the protected program or system. Such a dynamically assigned unique mark forms dynamically assigned sense of self of the protected program or system that enables us to effectively and efficiently distinguish the unmarked nonself (e.g.,malware actions) from marked self with no false positive. Since our artificial malware immunization technique does not require any specific knowledge of the malwares, it can be effective against new and previously unknown malwares. We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of our artificial malware immunization based on such dynamically assigned sense of self in Linux, and our automatic malware immunization tool has successfully immunized real-world, unpatched, vulnerable applications (e.g., Snort 2.6.1 with over 140,000 lines C code) against otherwise working exploits. In addition, our artificial malware immunization is effective against return-to-libc attacks and recently discovered return-oriented exploits. The overall run time performance overhead of our artificial malware immunization prototype is no more than 4%.