Recovery of jump table case statements from binary code
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on program comprehension (IWPC '99)
CCured: type-safe retrofitting of legacy code
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Writing Secure Code
MiSFIT: Constructing Safe Extensible Systems
IEEE Concurrency
ATEC '02 Proceedings of the General Track of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Type-Assisted Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
CSSV: towards a realistic tool for statically detecting all buffer overflows in C
PLDI '03 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2003 conference on Programming language design and implementation
Partial Automation of an Integrated Reverse Engineering Environment of Binary Code
WCRE '96 Proceedings of the 3rd Working Conference on Reverse Engineering (WCRE '96)
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Obfuscation of executable code to improve resistance to static disassembly
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Defending Embedded Systems Against Buffer Overflow via Hardware/Software
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
SELF: a transparent security extension for ELF binaries
Proceedings of the 2003 workshop on New security paradigms
PointguardTM: protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Transparent run-time defense against stack smashing attacks
ATEC '00 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Detours: binary interception of Win32 functions
WINSYM'99 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Windows NT Symposium - Volume 3
Detection and diagnosis of control interception
ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
Artificial malware immunization based on dynamically assigned sense of self
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
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Stack smashing is still one of the most popular techniques for computer system attack. In this work, we present an anti-stack-smashing defense technique for Microsoft Windows systems. Our approach works at install-time, and does not rely on having access to the source-code: The user decides when and which executables to vaccinate. Our technique consists of instrumenting a given executable with a mechanism to detect stack smashing attacks. We developed a prototype implementing our technique and verified that it successfully defends against actual exploit code. We then extended our prototype to vaccinate DLLs, multithreaded applications, and DLLs used by multithreaded applications, which present significant additional complications. We present promising performance results measured on SPEC2000 benchmarks: Vaccinated executables were no more than 8 percent slower than their un-vaccinated originals.