Guarded models for intrusion detection
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Weighting versus pruning in rule validation for detecting network and host anomalies
Proceedings of the 13th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Mining specifications of malicious behavior
Proceedings of the the 6th joint meeting of the European software engineering conference and the ACM SIGSOFT symposium on The foundations of software engineering
Mining specifications of malicious behavior
ISEC '08 Proceedings of the 1st India software engineering conference
Switchblade: enforcing dynamic personalized system call models
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
A practical mimicry attack against powerful system-call monitors
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Efficient IRM enforcement of history-based access control policies
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Selecting and Improving System Call Models for Anomaly Detection
DIMVA '09 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Malware Behavioral Detection by Attribute-Automata Using Abstraction from Platform and Language
RAID '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Exploiting Temporal Persistence to Detect Covert Botnet Channels
RAID '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Understanding precision in host based intrusion detection: formal analysis and practical models
RAID'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Enhancing Intrusion Detection System with proximity information
International Journal of Security and Networks
Artificial malware immunization based on dynamically assigned sense of self
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
Behavioral distance measurement using hidden markov models
RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Taint-enhanced anomaly detection
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
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Beginning with the work of Forrest et al, several researchers have developed intrusion detection techniques based on modeling program behaviors in terms of system calls. A weakness of these techniques is that they focus on control flows involving system calls, but not their arguments. This weakness makes them susceptible to several classes of attacks, including attacks on security-critical data, race-condition and symbolic link attacks, and mimicry attacks. To address this weakness, we develop a new approach for learning dataflow behaviors of programs. The novelty in our approach, as compared to previous system-call argument learning techniques, is that it learns temporal properties involving the arguments of different system calls, thus capturing the flow of security-sensitive data through the program. An interesting aspect of our technique is that it can be uniformly layered on top of most existing control-flow models, and can leverage control-flow contexts to significantly increase the precision of dataflows captured by the model. This contrasts with previous system-call argument learning techniques that did not leverage control-flow information, and moreover, were focused on learning statistical properties of individual system call arguments. Through experiments, we show that temporal properties enable detection of many attacks that aren't detected by previous approaches. Moreover, they support formal reasoning about security assurances that can be provided when a program follows its dataflow behavior model, e.g., tar would read only files located within a directory specified as a command-line argument.