Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Generating Coalition Structures with Finite Bound from the Optimal Guarantees
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Delivering services by building and running virtual organisations
BT Technology Journal
Markets vs auctions: Approaches to distributed combinatorial resource scheduling
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Smart Grid Technologies & Market Models
A comparison of distributed and centralised agent based bundling systems
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal combinatorial electricity markets
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Engineering large-scale distributed auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Modeling a resource contention in the management of virtual organizations
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Improved multi-unit auction clearing algorithms with interval (multiple-choice) knapsack problems
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
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This paper presents new clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with piecewise linear demand/supply functions. We analyse the complexity of our algorithms and prove that they are guaranteed to find the optimal allocation.