Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics

  • Authors:
  • Don Fallis

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Information Resources, University of Arizona, 1515 East First Street, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA/ E-mail: fallis@email.arizona.edu

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

Three of the major issues in information ethics – intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy – concern the morality of restricting people’s access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill, 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection with epistemology. In this paper, I illustrate how a value-theoretic approach to epistemology can help to clarify these major issues in information ethics. However, I also identify several open questions about epistemic values that need to be answered before we will be able to evaluate the epistemic consequences of many information policies.