Impact of incentive mechanisms on quality of experience
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Multimedia
FairPeers: Efficient Profit Sharing in Fair Peer-to-Peer Market Places
Journal of Network and Systems Management
A connection management protocol for promoting cooperation in Peer-to-Peer networks
Computer Communications
Counteracting free riding in Peer-to-Peer networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
INCA: qualitative reference framework for incentive mechanisms in P2P networks
International Journal of Computer Applications in Technology
Analytical dimensions for online gift giving: 'other-oriented' contributions in virtual communities
International Journal of Web Based Communities
Analysis of scale effects in peer-to-peer networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
ICA3PP'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and architectures for parallel processing
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
A novel reputation computation model based on subjective logic for mobile ad hoc networks
Future Generation Computer Systems
LiFTinG: lightweight freerider-tracking in gossip
Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 11th International Conference on Middleware
Evaluating stranger policies in P2P file-sharing systems with reciprocity mechanisms
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Self-Organized Formation and Evolution of Peer-to-Peer Networks
INFORMS Journal on Computing
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Peer-to-Peer networking is gaining popularity as a architecture for sharing information goods and other computing resources. However, these networks suffer from a high level of free-riding, whereby some users consume network resources without providing any network resources. The high levels of free-riding observed by several recent studies have led some tosuggest the imminent collapse of these communities as a viable information sharing mechanism.Our research develops analytic models to analyze the behavior of P2P networks in thepresence of free-riding. In contrast to previous predictions, we find that P2P networks can operate effectively in the presence of significant free-riding. However, we also show that without external incentives, the level of free-riding in P2P networks will be higher than sociallyoptimal. Our research also explores the implications of these findings for entrepreneurs, network designers, and copyright holders.