Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
The Impact of Free-Riding on Peer-to-Peer Networks
HICSS '04 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 7 - Volume 7
Limited reputation sharing in P2P systems
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
A Distributed and Measurement-Based Framework against Free Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '04 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
Game Theory As A Tool To Strategize As Well As Predict Nodes Behavior In Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICPADS '05 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems - Volume 01
To play or to control: a game-based control-theoretic approach to peer-to-peer incentive engineering
IWQoS'03 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Quality of service
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In this paper, we present a game-based model to analyze nodes' behaviors and influence of incentive mechanism on nodes in a peer-to-peer network in which the altruistic and selfish peers coexist. In this model, a mental cost is attached to a peer to describe the level of the peer's altruism and determine the type of the peer. The merit of our model is the relation between the equilibrium and incentive mechanism( i.e. the influence of incentive mechanism on equilibrium) can be denoted by an analytic formula directly. Therefore, we can evaluate and compare the efficiency of diversified incentive mechanisms conveniently, the network operators can choose proper incentive mechanism to achieve certain optimal objective.