Markets for attention: will postage for email help?
CSCW '02 Proceedings of the 2002 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work
IBM Systems Journal
SELS: a secure e-mail list service
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Email feedback: a policy-based approach to overcoming false positives
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
BPEL orchestration of secure webmail
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Secure web services
SpySaver: using incentives to address spyware
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Cybersecurity: Stakeholder incentives, externalities, and policy options
Telecommunications Policy
Symbiotic filtering for spam email detection
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
The security cost of cheap user interaction
Proceedings of the 2011 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
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We explore an alternative approach to spam based on economic rather than technological or regulatory screening mechanisms. We employ a model of email value which supports two intuitive notions: 1) mechanisms designed to promote valuable communication can often outperform those designed merely to block wasteful communication, and 2) designers of such mechansisms should shift focus away from the information in the message to the information known to the sender. We then use principles of information asymmetry to cause people who knowingly misuse communication to incur higher costs than those who do not. In certain cases, though not all, we can show this approach leaves recipients better off than even an idealized or "perfect" filter that costs nothing and makes no mistakes. Our mechanism also accounts for individual differences in opportunity costs, and allows for bi-directional wealth transfers while facilitating both sender signaling and recipient screening.