Intelligent information-sharing systems
Communications of the ACM
Semistructured messages are surprisingly useful for computer-supported coordination
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
Diversity in the use of electronic mail: a preliminary inquiry
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
A rule-based message filtering system
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
Communications of the ACM
Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
UAI'99 Proceedings of the Fifteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
PHEmail: designing a privacy honoring email system
CHI '03 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems
An economic answer to unsolicited communication
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Spam and the Social-Technical Gap
Computer
Quality improvement of email communication in work groups and organizations by reflection
GROUP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 international ACM SIGGROUP conference on Supporting group work
Synchronous broadcast messaging: the use of ICT
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
A multi-attribute, multi-weight clustering approach to managing ";e-mail overload"
Decision Support Systems
Detecting image spam using visual features and near duplicate detection
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Pricing electronic mail to solve the problem of spam
Human-Computer Interaction
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Information overload and viral marketing: countermeasures and strategies
SBP'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Social Computing, Behavioral Modeling, and Prediction
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Balancing the needs of information distributors and their audiences has grown harder in the age of the Internet. While the demand for attention continues to increase rapidly with the volume of information and communication, the supply of human attention is relatively fixed. Markets are a social institution for efficiently balancing supply and demand of scarce resources. Charging a price for sending messages may help discipline senders from demanding more attention than they are willing to pay for. Price may also help recipients estimate the value of a message before reading it. We report the results of two laboratory experiments to explore the consequences of a pricing system for electronic mail. Charging postage for email causes senders to be more selective and send fewer messages. However, recipients did not use the postage paid by senders as a signal of importance. These studies suggest markets for attention have potential, but their design needs more work.