Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms

Authors:
Kay-Yut Chen;Tad Hogg;Nathan Wozny
Affiliations:
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, CA;Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, CA;California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA
Venue:
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2004

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Abstract

We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.