Representing von Neumann–Morgenstern Games in the Situation Calculus

  • Authors:
  • Oliver Schulte;James Delgrande

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Canada E-mail: oschulte@cs.sfu.ca;School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Canada E-mail: jim@cs.sfu.ca

  • Venue:
  • Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2004

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Sequential von Neumann–Morgernstern (VM) games are a very general formalism for representing multi-agent interactions and planning problems in a variety of types of environments. We show that sequential VM games with countably many actions and continuous utility functions have a sound and complete axiomatization in the situation calculus. This axiomatization allows us to represent game-theoretic reasoning and solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. We discuss the application of various concepts from VM game theory to the theory of planning and multi-agent interactions, such as representing concurrent actions and using the Baire topology to define continuous payoff functions.