Artificial intelligence: the very idea
Artificial intelligence: the very idea
The computer and the mind
Computability and logic: 3rd ed.
Computability and logic: 3rd ed.
Cognitive science: an introduction
Cognitive science: an introduction
Computability, complexity, and languages (2nd ed.): fundamentals of theoretical computer science
Computability, complexity, and languages (2nd ed.): fundamentals of theoretical computer science
Analog computation via neural networks
Theoretical Computer Science
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
An argument for the uncomputability of infinitary mathematical expertise
Expertise in context
Why Go¨del's theorem cannot refute computationalism
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity - Special issue on uncoventional models of computation
How we know what technology can do
Communications of the ACM
What Robots Can and Can't Be
Elements of the Theory of Computation
Elements of the Theory of Computation
Artificial Intelligence and Literary Creativity: Inside the Mind of Brutus, a Storytelling Machine
Artificial Intelligence and Literary Creativity: Inside the Mind of Brutus, a Storytelling Machine
John Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness
Minds and Machines
In Computation, Parallel is Nothing, Physical Everything
Minds and Machines
Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and More
Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and More
Computation: finite and infinite machines
Computation: finite and infinite machines
Hypercomputation, Unconsciousness and Entertainment Technology
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Fun and Games
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We now know both that hypercomputation (or super-recursive computation) is mathematically well-understood, and that it provides a theory that according to some accounts for some real-life computation (e.g., operating systems that, unlike Turing machines, never simply output an answer and halt) better than the standard theory of computation at and below the "Turing Limit." But one of the things we do not know is whether the human mind hypercomputes, or merely computes--this despite informal arguments from Gödel, Lucas, Penrose and others for the view that, in light of incompleteness theorems, the human mind has powers exceeding those of TMs and their equivalents. All these arguments fail; their fatal flaws have been repeatedly exposed in the literature. However, we give herein a novel, formal modal argument showing that since it's mathematically possible that human minds are hypercomputers, such minds are in fact hypercomputers. We take considerable pains to anticipate and rebut objections to this argument.