On Building Robot Persons: Response to Zlatev

Authors:
Selmer Bringsjord
Affiliations:
Department of Cognitive Science, Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Troy NY 12180, USA/ E-mail: selmer@rpi.edu
Venue:
Minds and Machines
Year:
2004

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Abstract

Zlatev offers surprisingly weak reasoning in support of his view that robots with the right kind of developmental histories can have meaning. We ought nonetheless to praise Zlatev for an impressionistic account of how attending to the psychology of human development can help us build robots that appear to have intentionality.