Firewalls and Internet security: repelling the wily hacker
Firewalls and Internet security: repelling the wily hacker
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on security in the World Wide Web
Pessimal Print: A Reverse Turing Test
ICDAR '01 Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition
Using client puzzles to protect TLS
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Exploiting open functionality in SMS-capable cellular networks
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Mitigating attacks on open functionality in SMS-capable cellular networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
On countering online dictionary attacks with login histories and humans-in-the-loop
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
On attack causality in internet-connected cellular networks
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Exploiting open functionality in SMS-capable cellular networks
Journal of Computer Security
Mitigating attacks on open functionality in SMS-capable cellular networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A case study on computer security for non-expert computer user
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Southeast Regional Conference on XX
On cellular botnets: measuring the impact of malicious devices on a cellular network core
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detection of HTTP flooding attacks in multiple scenarios
Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Communication, Computing & Security
SMS of death: from analyzing to attacking mobile phones on a large scale
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
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We discuss the dangers that scalable Internet functionality may present to the real world, focusing upon an attack that is simple, yet can have great impact, which we believe may occur quite soon. We offer and critique various solutions to this class of attack and hope to provide a warning to the Internet community of what is currently possible. The attack is, to some degree, a consequence of the availability of private information on the Web, and the increase in the amount of personal information that users must reveal to obtain Web services.