Combinatorial optimization: algorithms and complexity
Combinatorial optimization: algorithms and complexity
Enhancement schemes for constraint processing: backjumping, learning, and cutset decomposition
Artificial Intelligence
Bipartite graphs and their applications
Bipartite graphs and their applications
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Nogood Recording for Valued Constraint Satisfaction Problems
ICTAI '96 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence
Constraint Processing
Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an Edge Worth?
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
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Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism. This mechanism guarantees that each agent's dominant strategy is to tell the truth, but it requires solving n+ 1 optimization problems when the overall optimal solution involves n agents. This paper first examines a case-study example demonstrating how Operations Research techniques can be used to compute Vickrey prices efficiently. In particular, the case-study focuses on the Assignment Problem. We show how, in this case, Vickrey prices can be computed in the same asymptotic time complexity as that of the original optimization problem. This case-study can be seen as serving a pedagogical role in the paper illustrating how Operations Research techniques can be used for fast Vickrey pricing. We then propose a Constraint Programming approach that can be used in a more general context, where nothing is assumed about the nature of the constraints that must be satisfied or the structure of the underlying problem. In particular, we demonstrate how nogood learning can be used to improve the efficiency of constraint-based Vickrey pricing in combinatorial auctions.