Adaptive versus Non-Adaptive Security of Multi-Party Protocols

Authors:
Ran Canetti;Ivan Damgard;Stefan Dziembowski;Yuval Ishai;Tal Malkin
Affiliations:
IBM Research, 19 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne, NY 10532, USA;BRICS, Aarhus University, Aabogade 34, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark;Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw, Banacha 2, PL-02-D97 Warsaw, Poland;Department of Computer Science, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel;Computer Science Department, Columbia University, New York, NY 6027-7003, USA
Venue:
Journal of Cryptology
Year:
2004

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Abstract

Security analysis of multi-party cryptographic protocols distinguishes between two types of adversarial settings: In the non-adaptive setting the set of corrupted parties is chosen in advance, before the interaction begins. In the adaptive setting the adversary chooses who to corrupt during the course of the computation. We study the relations between adaptive security (i.e., security in the adaptive setting) and nonadaptive security, according to two definitions and in several models of computation.