Strategic Deception in Agents

  • Authors:
  • David Christian;R. Michael Young

  • Affiliations:
  • North Carolina State University;North Carolina State University

  • Venue:
  • AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

Trust between agents is a well-studied concern for multiagent systems, but its counterpart, deception, deserves as much attention. In our area of research, interactive narrative generation, the study of deception is critical to the development of interesting and interactive stories.We describe an algorithm that explains how a deceiving agent might deceive a target agent in order to encourage the target agent to achieve a set of unspoken goals. The algorithm uses a modified planning process to ascertain the achievement of the unspoken goals while considering the goals of the deceived agent.