Best-Response Multiagent Learning in Non-Stationary Environments

  • Authors:
  • Michael Weinberg;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

  • Affiliations:
  • Hebrew University;Hebrew University

  • Venue:
  • AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

This paper investigates a relatively new direction in Multiagent Reinforcement Learning. Most multiagent learning techniques focus on Nash equilibria as elements of both the learning algorithm and its evaluation criteria. In contrast, we propose a multiagent learning algorithm that is optimal in the sense of finding a best-response policy, rather than in reaching an equilibrium. We present the first learning algorithm that is provably optimal against restricted classes of non-stationary opponents. The algorithm infers an accurate model of the opponentýs non-stationary strategy, and simultaneously creates a best-response policy against that strategy. Our learning algorithm works within the very general framework of n-player, general-sum stochastic games, and learns both the game structure and its associated optimal policy.