Non-Monotonic-Offers Bargaining Protocol

  • Authors:
  • Pinata Winoto;Gordon McCalla;Julita Vassileva

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Saskatchewan;University of Saskatchewan;University of Saskatchewan

  • Venue:
  • AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

This paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of non-monotonic-offers in alternating-offer bargaining protocol. It is commonly assumed that bargainers submit monotonic offers over time, which correspond to their belief revisions. However, through formal analysis and simulations, we are able to show that non-monotonic-offers protocols can generate higher average surplus and lower breakdown rate compared to monotonic-offers protocols.