A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient oblivious transfer protocols
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Communication preserving protocols for secure function evaluation
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
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Mechanism Design is the algorithmic component of Game Theory, the synthesis of protocols for selfish parties to achieve certain properties. A protocol is a method to aggregate the preferences of the parties in order to decide on some "social choice," where typical examples include: deciding whether a community should build a bridge, how to route packets in a network and deciding who wins an auction. Each party has a utility function which expresses how much it values each possible outcome of the protocol. The goal is to design a protocol where the winning strategies achieve the social choice. Recently Mechanism Design has received attention by computer scientists in light of the above applications, see [19, 20].