Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Cost profile of a highly assured, secure operating system
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Proceedings of the 8th European software engineering conference held jointly with 9th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Lattice-Based Access Control Models
Computer
Verification of a Formal Security Model for Multiapplicative Smart Cards
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
A Model of Cooperative Noninterference for Integrated Modular Avionics
DCCA '99 Proceedings of the conference on Dependable Computing for Critical Applications
Design and verification of secure systems
SOSP '81 Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
MAGE: A Distributed Programming Model
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
BLACKER: Security for the DDN, Examples of A1 Security Engineering Trades
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Compact FPGA-based True and Pseudo Random Number Generators
FCCM '03 Proceedings of the 11th Annual IEEE Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines
MLS-PCA: A High Assurance Security Architecture for Future Avionics
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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In order to solve future Multi Level Security (MLS) problems, we have developed a solution based on the DARPA Polymorphous Computing Architecture (PCA). MLS-PCA uses a novel distributed process-level encryption scheme to provide high assurance separation between different security levels. High level security evaluations of the TCSEC and Common Criteria require formal specification. Further, in order to enhance our understanding of the model and to facilitate a high assurance implementation, we have formally specified the architecture in Alloy. This paper presents our efforts to produce the formal model and what we have learned from it. We found a number of errors and initiated design changes as a result of the modeling effort.