The liar; an essay in truth and circularity
The liar; an essay in truth and circularity
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Common knowledge does not have the Beth property
Information Processing Letters
Limit knowledge of rationality
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
W: a logic system based on shared common knowledge views
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KES'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Knowledge-based and intelligent information and engineering systems - Volume Part I
Public Announcement Logic in Geometric Frameworks
Fundamenta Informaticae
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This paper investigates the relationships between three different views of common knowledge: the iterate approach, the fixed point approach, and the shared environment approach. We show that no two of these approaches are equivalent, contrary to accepted wisdom. We argue that the fixed point is the best conceptual analysis of the pretheoretic notion, but that the shared environment approach has its own role to play in understanding how common knowledge is used. We also discuss the assumptions under which various versions of the iterate approach are equivalent to the fixed point approach. We find that, for common knowledge, these assumptions are false, but that for simply having information, the assumptions are not so implausible, at least in the case of finite situations.