How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
An optimally robust hybrid mix network
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Mix-Networks on Permutation Networks
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Millimix: Mixing in Small Batches
Millimix: Mixing in Small Batches
Reliable MIX cascade networks through reputation
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Real-time mixes: a bandwidth-efficient anonymity protocol
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Achieving simultaneous distribution control and privacy protection for Internet media delivery
ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications, and Applications (TOMCCAP)
Verifiable Rotation of Homomorphic Encryptions
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
Minimum Disclosure Counting for the Alternative Vote
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Deterring voluntary trace disclosure in re-encryption mix-networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Auditable privacy: on tamper-evident mix networks
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
Efficiently shuffling in public
PKC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
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No matter how well designed and engineered, a mix server offers little protection if its administrator can be convinced to log and selectively disclose correspondences between its input and output messages, either for profit or to cooperate with an investigation. In this paper we propose a technique, fragile mixing, to discourage an administrator from revealing such correspondences, assuming he is motivated to protect the unlinkability of other communications that flow through the mix (e.g., his own). Briefly, fragile mixing implements the property that any disclosure of an input-message-to-output-message correspondence discloses all such correspondences for that batch of output messages. We detail this technique in the context of a re-encryption mix, its integration with a mix network, and incentive and efficiency issues.