Denial of Service against the Domain Name System
IEEE Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Visualization for computer security
On interdomain routing security and pretty secure BGP (psBGP)
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
TARP: Ticket-based address resolution protocol
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
An enhanced secure ARP protocol and LAN switch for preveting ARP based attacks
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing: Connecting the World Wirelessly
ROFL: routing as the firewall layer
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms
Data reduction by identification and correlation of TCP/IP attack attributes for network forensics
Proceedings of the International Conference & Workshop on Emerging Trends in Technology
A new way towards security in TCP/IP protocol suite
ICCOMP'10 Proceedings of the 14th WSEAS international conference on Computers: part of the 14th WSEAS CSCC multiconference - Volume I
WOOT'12 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies
Under new management: practical attacks on SNMPv3
WOOT'12 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies
When tolerance causes weakness: the case of injection-friendly browsers
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
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About fifteen years ago, I wrote a paper on security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite, In particular, I focused on protocol-level issues, rather than implementation flaws. It is instructive to look back at that paper, to see where my focus and my predictions were accurate, where I was wrong, and where dangers have yet to happen. This is a reprint of the original paper, with added commentary.