There's something about Mary: The moral value of things qua information objects

Authors:
Kenneth Einar Himma
Affiliations:
Department of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, USA 98119
Venue:
Ethics and Information Technology
Year:
2004

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Abstract

Luciano Floridi argues that every existing entity is deserving of at least minimal moral respect in virtue of having intrinsic value qua "information object." In this essay, I attempt a comprehensive assessment of this important view as well as the arguments Floridi offers in support of it. I conclude both that the arguments are insufficient and that the thesis itself is substantively implausible from the standpoint of ordinary intuitions.