Artificial experts: social knowledge and intelligent machines
Artificial experts: social knowledge and intelligent machines
Intelligence without representation
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial knowing: gender and the thinking machine
Artificial knowing: gender and the thinking machine
There's something about Mary: The moral value of things qua information objects
Ethics and Information Technology
A Pragmatic Evaluation of the Theory of Information Ethics
Ethics and Information Technology
Delegating and Distributing Morality: Can We Inscribe Privacy Protection in a Machine?
Ethics and Information Technology
The philosophy of presence: from epistemic failure to successful observation
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments - Special section: Legal, ethical, and policy issues associated with virtual environments and computer mediated reality
Floridi's Philosophy of Information and Information Ethics: Current Perspectives, Future Directions
The Information Society - The Philosophy of Information, its Nature, and Future Developments
Ethics and Information Technology
On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents
International Journal of Technoethics
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This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE's move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett's views on 驴as if' intentionality and Magnani's characterization of 驴moral mediators'. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE's treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.