The Changing Architecture of Advertising Agencies
Marketing Science
Editorial: Who Is Afraid to Give Freedom of Speech to Marketing Folks?
Marketing Science
Optimal Data Interval for Estimating Advertising Response
Marketing Science
The Changing Architecture of Advertising Agencies
Marketing Science
Editorial: Who Is Afraid to Give Freedom of Speech to Marketing Folks?
Marketing Science
Advertising Competition in a Dynamic Oligopoly with Multiple Brands
Operations Research
Modeling pricing strategies using game theory and support vector machines
ICDM'10 Proceedings of the 10th industrial conference on Advances in data mining: applications and theoretical aspects
Profit loss in differentiated oligopolies
Operations Research Letters
Advertising Effects in Presidential Elections
Marketing Science
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We investigate differences in the dynamics of marketing decisions across geographic markets empirically. We begin with a linear-quadratic game involving forward-looking firms competing on prices and advertising. Based on the corresponding Markov perfect equilibrium, we propose estimable econometric equations for demand and marketing policy. Our model allows us to measure empirically the strategic response of competitors along with economic measures such as firm profitability. We use a rich dataset that combines sales, marketing mix, factor cost, and advertising cost data for eighteen geographic markets in the frozen entr脙©e category.We find that larger markets tend to be less price-sensitive and more profitable than smaller markets. We also find evidence of positive carryover of own advertising on own demand. In terms of consumer substitution patterns, we find that the role of advertising (in our data) seems to be more category-building (complementary) than share-stealing (competitive). The complementary role is stronger in larger markets. On the supply side, we find that firms make smaller adjustments to own advertising as goodwill goes up. Consistent with cross-advertising effects on demand, firms make smaller (larger) adjustments to advertising in response to competitive goodwill in the less competitive larger (in the more competitive smaller) markets. Finally, we find that consumer welfare decreases (increases) in larger (smaller) markets when firms move to a zero-advertising regime.