MISPAR: mitigating stealthy packet dropping in locally-monitored multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
Universe Detectors for Sybil Defense in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks
SSS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
Brief announcement: lightweight key agreement and digital certificates for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 28th ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Detecting Sybil attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks using neighboring information
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
On grid-based key pre-distribution: toward a better connectivity in wireless sensor network
PAKDD'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Emerging technologies in knowledge discovery and data mining
MPC: mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Improving security in WMNs with reputation systems and self-organizing maps
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Location verification based defense against sybil attack in sensor networks
ICDCN'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Networking
MSN: mutual secure neighbor verification in multi-hop wireless networks
Security and Communication Networks
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Sybil attack is a harmful threat to sensor networks, in which a malicious node illegally forges an unbounded number of identities to defeat redundancy mechanisms. Digital certificates are a way to prove identities. However, they are not viable in sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a light-weight identity certificate method to defeat Sybil attacks. Our proposed method uses one-way key chains and Merkle hash trees. The method thereby avoids the need for public key cryptography. In addition, the method provides a means for authentication of all data messages. A variant of this method is presented that has lower computational requirements under certain conditions. The security of each method is analyzed, and is as good or better than previously-proposed approaches, with fewer assumptions. The overhead (computation, storage, and messages) is also shown to be acceptable for use in sensor networks.