A Collusion Attack on Pairwise Key Predistribution Schemes for Distributed Sensor Networks

Authors:
Tyler Moore
Affiliations:
University of Cambridge
Venue:
PERCOMW '06 Proceedings of the 4th annual IEEE international conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Year:
2006

Citing 0
Cited 5

ID-Based Multiple Space Key Pre-distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks

WWIC '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Wired/Wireless Internet Communications
Secure and Energy Efficient Key Management Scheme Using Authentication in Cluster Based Routing Protocol

FGIT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Future Generation Information Technology
Attack-resilient random key distribution scheme for distributed sensor networks

EUC'07 Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Emerging direction in embedded and ubiquitous computing
A key distribution scheme preventing collusion attacks in ubiquitous heterogeneous sensor networks

EUC'07 Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Emerging direction in embedded and ubiquitous computing
Per node deployment based detection of controlled link establishment attack in distributed sensor networks

International Journal of Sensor Networks

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Key predistribution schemes are a favoured solution for establishing secure communication in sensor networks. Often viewed as the safest way to bootstrap trust, the main drawback is seen to be the large storage overhead imposed on resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we argue that predistribution schemes can actually be quite insecure: pre-loading global secrets onto exposed devices strengthens the incentive for attackers to compromise nodes. Furthermore, lack of coordination between nodes arising from localised communication helps attackers hide misbehaviour. We consider one scheme in particular-Chan et al.'s random pairwise key predistribution [3] - and demonstrate an attack where colluding nodes reuse selected pairwise keys to create many false identities. We find that a small, colluding minority can hijack a majority of node communication channels. Finally, we consider countermeasures, from improved detection to scrapping predistribution altogether.