Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Diffie-Hellman key distribution extended to group communication
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Communications of the ACM
Ad hoc networking
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Distributed Clustering for Ad Hoc Networks
ISPAN '99 Proceedings of the 1999 International Symposium on Parallel Architectures, Algorithms and Networks
Report on a working session on security in wireless ad hoc networks
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
Multi-level hierarchies for scalable ad hoc routing
Wireless Networks
Minimizing communication costs in hierarchically-clustered networks of wireless sensors
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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In this paper, we describe a secure cluster-routing protocol based on a multilayer scheme in ad hoc networks. This work provides scalable, threshold authentication scheme in ad hoc networks. We present detailed security threats against ad hoc routing protocols, specifically examining cluster-based routing. Our proposed protocol, called "authentication based on multilayer clustering for ad hoc networks" (AMCAN), designs an end-to-end authentication protocol that relies on mutual trust between nodes in other clusters. The AMCAN strategy takes advantage of a multilayer architecture that is designed for an authentication protocol in a cluster head (CH) using a new concept of control cluster head (CCH) scheme. We propose an authentication protocol that uses certificates containing an asymmetric key and a multilayer architecture so that the CCH is achieved using the threshold scheme, thereby reducing the computational overhead and successfully defeating all identified attacks. We also use a more extensive area, such as a CCH, using an identification protocol to build a highly secure, highly available authentication service, which forms the core of our security framework.