Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine
WWW7 Proceedings of the seventh international conference on World Wide Web 7
How not to design a privacy system: reflections on the process behind the Freedom product
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Review: A survey on solutions and main free tools for privacy enhancing Web communications
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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Privacy-providing tools, including tools that provide anonymity, are gaining popularity in the modern world. Among the goals of their users is avoiding tracking and profiling. While some businesses are unhappy with the growth of privacy-enhancing technologies, others can use lack of information about their users to avoid unnecessary liability and even possible harassment by parties with contrary business interests, and to gain a competitive market edge.Currently, users interested in anonymous browsing have the choice only between single-hop proxies and the few more complex systems that are available. These still leave the user vulnerable to long-term intersection attacks.In this paper, we propose a caching proxy system for allowing users to retrieve data from the World-Wide Web in a way that would provide recipient unobservability by a third party and sender unobservability by the recipient and thus dispose with intersection attacks, and report on the prototype we built using Google.