A resilient packet-forwarding scheme against maliciously packet-dropping nodes in sensor networks
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Autonomous and distributed node recovery in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
LiteWorp: Detection and isolation of the wormhole attack in static multihop wireless networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
Self-monitoring for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
MISPAR: mitigating stealthy packet dropping in locally-monitored multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
Secure localization in wireless sensor networks
AsiaCSN '07 Proceedings of the Fourth IASTED Asian Conference on Communication Systems and Networks
Model for survivability of wireless sensor network
MSN'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile ad-hoc and sensor networks
MPC: mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
MSN: mutual secure neighbor verification in multi-hop wireless networks
Security and Communication Networks
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Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes' communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.